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Tradition-based Rationality 
 
By Dr. Brad J. Kallenberg 
Accepted for publication at the Colossian Forum on Faith, Science and Culture 
 
The term “tradition-based rationality” derives from the works of Alasdair MacIntyre. Human 
reasoning, argued MacIntyre, is both tradition-constitutive and tradition-constituted. 
By the first phrase he means that all reasoning, especially moral reasoning (i.e., thinking about 
what “good” means), involves people sharing a conceptual language (rather than a natural 
language like English or Chinese). For example, think of how widely three persons may differ on 
their use of the word “good” when applied to their jobs. The driver of a beer truck will claim his 
job is “good” because he is paid well; he is resoundingly welcomed wherever he goes; and he 
has predictable hours, time off, perhaps even pension benefits and discount on beer. In contrast, 
imagine a woman who has surrendered a lucrative upper management job to become the 
coordinator of tutoring and after-school programming in an urban school district. The job is 
tough, the hours are long, and the pay is poor. But she insists, “I have a good job.” In strong 
contrast with both of these stands Mother Teresa of Calcutta, whose “job” neither paid well nor, 
truth be told, made predictable differences in the lives of the dying lepers whom she hugged 
(sometimes yes, sometimes no; hard to tell). Still, Mother Teresa would also insist that she had a 
“good” job. 
Each of these persons can compose a sentence in English, “I have a good job.” But they do not 
speak the same conceptual languages. Nor could these three settle among themselves whose job 
is “most good” by using the word “good,” because “good” means something radically distinct in 
each case. The driver’s pursuit of personal perks cannot be compared with the coordinator’s goal 
of “making a difference,” neither of which can be compared with Mother Teresa’s quest “to 
resemble Jesus come what may.” The driver and the coordinator may come to appreciate Mother 
Teresa’s meaning, but that will require of them a radical change in outlook (called “conversion”). 
One learns a conceptual language not by reading a dictionary, but by immersion in a way of 
life. One comes to read music with comprehension while learning to play an instrument (or sing 
in a choir) with other musicians. So too for the language of theology. By participating with 
others in those activities in which the word “God” is at home — activities such as praying, 
confessing, thanking, evangelizing, worshiping — one will slowly become fluent in the language 
of God. 
To share a conceptual language is to share a form of life. To share a form of life is to be a 
community, (Latin, comunus, co-world). Being a community involves, among other things, 
perpetually teaching the children which goods are real, and therefore worth pursuing. Getting 
this pursuit right takes more than a single lifetime. So in a very real sense the living community 
needs to include those former members who are no longer living. Such a multiple-lifetime 
community is what MacIntyre calls a “tradition.” In After Virtue, he defines tradition as “an 
historically extended, socially embodied argument.”1 
The “argument” he refers to is none other than the ongoing discussion over what words like 
“good” (and “good news”) mean. Adherents to a living tradition show their understanding of 
such terms by the way that they talk and live with each other. For example, Christians understand 
“Good News” to entail daily acts of forgiveness. Christians’ forgiveness of each other ought thus 
to be regular enough for outsiders to recognize it in the pattern of Christian interactions. 
(Likewise, Christian communities that are devoid of such daily acts of forgiveness display that 
their concept of forgiveness is empty.) In MacIntyre’s terms, the Christian concept of 
“forgiveness” is “socially embodied.” Because this discussion and living out of the “Good 
News” carries forward from one generation to the next, the argument is both “historically 
extended” and “socially embodied.” 
In sum, human reasoning is tradition-constitutive, because the entire web of conversations 
across time, conversations which employ the same concept of “good,” constitutes a living 
tradition. MacIntyre’s second phrase, namely tradition-constituted, follows from the first. 
Human reasoning is always (can never but be) located within some tradition or other. Of course, 
this fact poses challenges for a tradition like Christianity whose good includes sharing a message 
to adherents of rival traditions. To recall the earlier example, the three uses of “good” in “I have 
a good job,” cannot be translated from one conceptual language to the next. One can only 
understand a rival concept by being an insider to the tradition that uses the term. (In a later book 
MacIntyre explains how becoming an insider may be aided by employing the kind of 
imagination an anthropologist uses when studying a new tribe.
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But notice that imagination is not translation. Incommensurable terms have no synonyms in 
the other tradition. So understanding is not achieved by translation. The message of “Christ 
crucified” remains pure lunacy to Greek thinkers (1 Cor 1:23). Nevertheless, one may possibly, 
if slowly, become fluent in the rival conceptual language.) The conclusion is this: Living 
conceptual traditions are themselves the “the repositories of standards of rationality … which are 
crucial to moral deliberation and action.”3 
Said negatively, apart from the shared life within some particular tradition, “there is no 
standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, 
evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument.”4 
Said positively, the sharing of a conceptual language enables sharers to understand each other 
about what things are good, about what human life is for. 
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